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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1953, as amended).

STATEMENT OF ISSUE AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Did the trial court properly instruct the jury regarding the relevant law? As a
general rule, Utah appellate courts review jury instructions under a correctness standard,
granting no particular deference to the trial court. See Ong Int'l (U.S.A.) Inc. v. 11th Ave.
Corp.. 850 P.2d 447, 452 (Utah 1993); State v. Gibson. 908 P.2d 352, 354 (Utah
App.1995), cert, denied. 917 P.2d 556 (Utah 1996). "It is within the trial court's
discretion, however, to select between two accurate but different jury instructions." State
v. Gallegos. 849 P.2d 586, 588 (Utah App. 1993) (citing State v. Pedersen. 802 P.2d
1328, 1332 (Utah App.), cert, denied. 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1990)). Also, Utah appellate
courts "review jury instructions in their entirety to determine whether the instructions,
taken as a whole, fairly instruct the jury on the applicable law." Laws v. Blanding City.
893 P.2d 1083, 1084 (Utah App.), cert, denied. 910 P.2d 425 (Utah 1995).

1

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Annotated § 41-6a-502
Utah Code Annotated § 41-6a-524
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 11(e)(2)
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 19 ("Instructions")

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The City of Orem ("the City") concurs in Longoria's statement of the case.

STATEMENT OF FACTS1
Orem police officers arrested Longoria on 3 September 2005 for suspicion of
impaired driving. R. 00005. During the DUI investigation, Longoria refused to submit to
field sobriety tests or chemical tests to determine his level of intoxication.2 See
generally Jury Trial Partial Transcript (discussing Longoria's requests for specific jury

1

Longoria did not file a complete transcript of the proceedings below. Thus, this
statement of facts must remain abbreviated and without recitation of all evidence
supporting the jury verdict of guilty. Accordingly, the City will recite only those facts
that can be gleaned from the record on appeal and that pertain directly to the challenged
jury instructions
2

This brief will refer to field sobriety tests and chemical tests either individually,
or collectively as "sobriety tests." For purposes of analysis, the two are indistinguishable
and should be subject to identical jury instructions.
2

instructions). At a jury trial held on 11 January 2006, the trial court issued two jury
instructions regarding Longoria's refusal to submit to sobriety tests. Those instructions
stated as follows:
INSTRUCTION NO. 10
REFUSAL TO SUBMIT TO FIELD SOBRIETY TEST. You are
instructed that under the law the refusal of a person to submit to a field
sobriety tests [sic] is best described as conduct indicating a consciousness
of guilt.
R.00046
INSTRUCTION NO. 13
REFUSAL TO SUBMIT TO BREATH TEST. You are
instructed that under the law the refusal of a person to submit
to a chemical breath test is best described as conduct
indicating a consciousness of guilt.
R. 00043. After the jury found Longoria guilty, he moved the trial court for a new trial
on the basis that the instructions listed above unfairly shifted the burden of proof to
Longoria. R. 00103. On 10 May 2006, the trial court granted a new trial. R. 00143.
The trial court held a new jury trial on 18 December 2006. See Jury Trial Partial
Transcript. Over Longoria's objections, the trial court instructed the jury regarding
Longoria's refusal to submit to sobriety tests as follows:
The Defendant is not required, by law, to submit to the
officer's request to perform field sobriety tests; however, you
may take notice of and give whatever weight you determine to
the fact that the defendant refused to perform any field
sobriety tests.
R. 00227.

3

You may take notice of and give whatever weight you
determine to the Defendant's refusal to submit to the blood or
breath test requested by the officer, just as you may weigh and
consider any evidence presented to you.
R. 00228. The second jury found Longoria guilty of impaired driving and reckless
driving. R. 00236-37. This appeal followed.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS3
Appellant Longoria relies solely on a flawed analogy to cases dealing with a
suspect fleeing from officers for the proposition that this Court should reverse his
conviction. Flight from officers presents a particular relevance problem that must be
cured by limiting instructions. Those relevance problems do not exist in the case of a
suspect who refuses to submit to sobriety tests because such refusal is directly and
imminently probative of the suspect's guilt or innocence of the charged crime. Thus, the
trial court committed no error in refusing to instruct the jury that refusal to submit to
sobriety tests is susceptible of an innocent explanation.
Further, no possible reading of the jury instructions could reveal an express or
implied mandate from the trial court for the jury to presume Longoria's guilt or otherwise

3

A large portion of Longoria's brief refers to issues that he has not brought before
the Court in this case. For example, Longoria's brief refers extensively to his double
jeopardy claim below without raising the issue on appeal. Further, Longoria's brief
seems to complain of the trial court's instructions to the jury in the first trial. However,
any errors in the trial court's instructions in the first trial were cured by granting a new
trial. Accordingly, this brief will focus solely on the jury instructions in the second trial,
as those instructions constitute the entirety of issues squarely before this Court.
4

improperly shift the burden of proof to the defendant. Longoria's argument in this regard
contains inadequate briefing and this Court should disregard it. The argument on its face
has no merit.
Even if this Court determines the trial court's instructions were erroneous under
State v. Bales, it should similarly follow Bales in concluding that such error was
harmless. See 675 P.2d 573, 574 (Utah 1983). Where sufficient evidence supports the
verdict, even in the absence of evidence of Longoria's refusal to submit to sobriety tests,
and where the jury instructions fairly stated the law, a jury verdict should not be
overturned simply because the jury instructions "are not as full or accurate as they might
have been." State v. Tuckett 2000 UT App 295,^9 (quotations and citation omitted).

ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED NO REVERSIBLE ERROR
A.

Longoria offers no applicable authority

Longoria argues on appeal that the trial court committed reversible error by failing
to instruct the jury that failure to submit to sobriety tests could be susceptible of an
innocent explanation. He cites as his only authority two cases dealing with flight from
officers, wherein appellate courts have required jury instructions to that effect. See State
v. Bales. 675 P.2d 573, 574 (Utah 1983); State v. Howland. 761 P.2d 579 (Utah App.
1988). Not only did these cases deal with the issue of instructing the jury regarding
possibly innocent explanations for flight, they also dealt with an impermissible shifting of
5

the burden of proof to the defendant by instructing the jury that flight constitutes an
"implied admission" of guilt. See Bales. 675 P.2d 576; Howland. 761 P.2d 580 fii.l.
In the present appeal, Bales and Howland are unavailing. Those cases thoroughly
discuss compelling problems arising particularly from flight cases that are just as
compellingly distinguishable from refusal to perform field sobriety or chemical tests. In
Bales, witnesses observed the defendants peering into a residence, and later officers
observed them leaving the front porch. See Bales, 675 P.2d at 574. When ordered by
officers to stop, both defendants immediately fled. See id. At trial on charges of
aggravated burglary, the trial court gave the following instruction:
The flight or attempted flight of a person immediately after
the commission of a crime or after he is accused of a crime
that has been committed, is not sufficient in itself to establish
his guilt, but is a fact which, if proven, may be considered by
you in the light of all other proven facts in deciding the
question of his guilt or innocence. The weight to which such
circumstance is entitled is a matter for the jury to determine.
You are further instructed that flight affords a basis for an
inference of consciousness of guilt and constitutes an implied
admission.
Id. The Utah Supreme Court extensively analyzed the appropriateness of this instruction,
and concluded that the first paragraph fairly stated the law: "We are . . . persuaded that
the first paragraph of the flight instruction given in this case was acceptable in view of the
evidence." Id. at 575.
The Utah Supreme Court did caution, however, that additional language would be
appropriate. The Court determined that a "flight instruction will not be completely free
6

from criticism unless it advises the jury that there may be reasons for flight fully
consistent with innocence and that even if consciousness of guilt is inferred from flight it
does not necessarily reflect actual guilt of the crime charged." Id.4
Although the Supreme Court did not couch the analysis in such terms, its decision
in Bales essentially turned on a question of relevance. The Supreme Court cited several
cases for the proposition that flight evidence has limited probative value. The Bales court
quoted the United States Supreme Court's language in Wong Sun v. United States, which
stated "'We have consistently doubted the probative value in criminal trials of evidence
that the accused fled the scene of an actual or supposed crime.'" Bales, 675 P.2d at 574
(quoting Wong Sun. 371 U.S. 471, 483 fti.10, 83 S.Ct. 407, 415 fh.10 (1963)). The Bales
court cited several other cases for the proposition that flight evidence has limited
probative value in determining the guilt of the charged offense. See id. at 575 (citing
Miller v. United States. 320 F.2d 767, 773 (D.C.Cir.1963) (explaining that flight does not
necessarily reflect guilt, that jurors may (but need not) consider flight as one circumstance
tending to show feelings of guilt, and that they may (but need not) consider feelings of
guilt as evidence tending to show actual guilt); Austin v. United States. 414 F.2d 1155,
1157 (D.C.Cir. 1969) (explaining that many motives may prompt flight); United States v.
Borders. 693 F.2d 1318, 1327-28 (11th Cir.1982), cert, denied. 461 U.S. 905, 103 S.Ct.

4

State v. Howland is the only other case Longoria cites for the proposition that a
trial court must instruct the jury regarding the susceptibility of flight to an innocent
explanation. See 761 P.2d 579 (Utah 1988), Howland adds nothing to the Bales analysis,
but simply follows Bales without nearly as much analysis and citation. See id. at 580.
7

1875 (1983) (explaining that consciousness of guilt is not necessarily consciousness of
guilt of the crime charged). See also U.S. v. Akers. 215 F.3d 1089,1103 (10th Cir. 2000)
(discussing various facts and circumstances that render flight more probative than
prejudicial).
Thus, the major potential problem with flight evidence and instructions, under the
Bales court's analysis, is a question of relevance. Flight from officers may evidence a
consciousness of guilt, or it may not. Even if such flight does evidence a consciousness
of guilt, such guilt may not be related to the crime the officers suspect. In addition to the
reasons provided in the cases cited above, a fleeing suspect may flee because she has
outstanding warrants, or because she has contraband in her pockets, not because she
committed the burglary officers suspect. In other words, flight from officers poses a
special evidentiary problem because it may bear no logically necessary relationship to the
defendant's guilt or innocence of the suspected crime. Although flight evidence may be
relevant enough to be admissible, it requires a special instruction regarding the possibility
of an innocent explanation. See Bales, 675 P.2d at 575. However, Bales did not say that
jurors may not infer consciousness of guilt from a suspect's flight. See id. (stating "even
if consciousness of guilt is inferred from flight it does not necessarily reflect actual guilt
of the crime charged").
Other jurisdictions have dealt with the problem of innocent explanations of flight.
Such explanations have included a fear of mob violence, see People v. Bundv, 129 N.E.
189 (111. 1920), demands of business or other pressing duties, see Caples v. State, 167
8

S.W. 730 (Tex. 1914), and a desire to avoid the indignities of jail, see State v. Sparks, 195
S.W. 1031 (Mo. 1917).
Bales and Howland constitute the entire authority upon which Longoria urges this
Court to reverse his conviction. His analysis expressly analogizes refusal to submit to
sobriety tests with flight from officers. However, Longoria offers no reasoned analysis
for the proposition that the two scenarios are analogous. That fact alone should be fatal to
Longoria's claims on appeal.
In fact, the flight cases are compellingly distinguishable from the present case.
Refusal to submit to sobriety tests does not present a relevance problem similar to that
found in the flight cases. Flight from officers could be easily susceptible of an innocent
explanation, such as the presence of warrants, failure to properly appreciate an officer's
identity, or the presence of contraband unrelated to the currently suspected crime. Lawful
requests to participate in sobriety tests, however, constitute well-established and
judicially- and legislatively-approved investigatory techniques specifically designed to
determine whether a suspect is alcohol impaired.
Sobriety tests, as investigatory methods, are so narrowly tailored to the suspected
crime of driving while impaired that it is difficult to imagine a single fact scenario that
would suggest an innocent explanation for a suspect's refusal to perform the tests. In the
flight cases, innocent hypothetical explanations abound, but neither in his argument
before the trial court nor in his brief to this Court has Longoria proffered any innocent

9

hypothetical explanations for a refusal to perform the requested tests.5 The reason for this
is that a suspect's refusal to perform the requested tests bears a very special logical
relevance to the suspected crime of impaired driving. Submission to the tests would
prove an innocent person innocent and prove a guilty person guilty. A suspect not fleeing
has no such power to prove guilt or innocence. Thus, refusal to submit to the requested
tests is not so easily susceptible of an innocent explanation as in the case of flight from
officers, and is therefore far more probative of the defendant's actual guilt of the charged
crime. Remaining at the scene of a crime may reveal to officers the presence of unrelated
contraband; providing a breath sample will only reveal the level of intoxication.
Although Utah courts have never addressed the issue of the relevance of a
suspect's refusal to perform sobriety tests, a brief sampling of case law from other
jurisdictions reveals that courts across the country widely accept the view that a suspect's
refusal is relevant to the ultimate question of guilt or innocence. See, e.g.. Hill v State,
366 So 2d 318 (Ala. 1979); Williford v State. 653 P2d 339 (Alaska App. 1982); Allen v
State. 330 SE2d 588 (Ga. 1985); People v Miller. 394 NE2d 783 (111. 1979); People v
Kane. 584 NE2d 1044 (111. 1991); People v Haitz. 411 NYS2d 57 (1978); People v
Ferrara. 602 NYS2d 86 (1993); State v Albright. 298 NW2d 196 (Wis 1980).

5

Judge Backlund, during a hearing on the proposed jury instructions, stated "I thought
the a, argument for the new trial was the consciousness of guilt thing, not that there are other
reasons consistent with innocence to not take the chemical test. For the life of me I can't figure
out what they would be." Jury Trial Partial Transcript, p.6.
10

Further, Utah Code section 41-6a-524 expressly authorizes the introduction of
evidence of a suspect's refusal to submit to chemical tests.
If a person under arrest refuses to submit to a chemical test or
tests or any additional test under Section 41-6a-520, evidence
of any refusal is admissible in any civil or criminal action or
proceeding arising out of acts alleged to have been committed
while the person was operating or in actual physical control of
a motor vehicle while: (1) under the influence of:
(a) alcohol....
Id. Refusal to perform field sobriety tests on the road should receive evidentiary
treatment no different from refusal to submit to chemical tests. The Utah Legislature has
expressly authorized introduction of that evidence in criminal impaired driving
proceedings, and has required nothing further by way of cautionary instructions to the
jury.
If courts should analogize refusal to perform field sobriety tests to any other
scenario, the analogy to a refusal to provide fingerprint or voice samples or other
performances that provide direct evidence of a suspect's guilt or innocence would be
better suited than the analogy to flight from officers. In U.S. v. Jackson, for example, the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that evidence of a suspect's refusal to furnish
handwriting samples was probative of his guilt for participating in a scheme involving
alteration of postal money orders. See 886 F.2d 838, 848 (7th Cir. 1989). The Seventh
Circuit in that case concluded that the probative value of the defendant's refusal to submit
handwriting exemplars far outweighed any "conjectural" prejudice, and affirmed the trial
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court's admission of the evidence. Icl The court provided no requirement for jury
instructions dealing with possibly innocent explanations for the defendant's refusal.
Because the flight cases are solely concerned with the flight evidence's probative
value and because no such concern arises out of a suspect's refusal to perform sobriety
tests, the flight cases Longoria has cited are distinguishable from the present case. Bales
and Howland are thus inapplicable, and do not provide a legal basis for reversing the
defendant's convictions here. Longoria has cited no further authority demanding a jury
instruction regarding a possibly innocent explanation. Without such authority, this Court
cannot grant Longoria the relief he requests.

B.

The jury instructions did not shift the burden of proof to Longoria

On pages 11 and 12 of his brief, Longoria argues that the instructions at issue in
this case unfairly shifted the burden of proof to Longoria, in violation of the presumption
of innocence. In support of that argument, Longoria cites State v. Robichaux, 639 P.2d
207 (Utah 1981) and Howland. 761 P.2d at 580 fii.l.
Robichaux certainly deals with jury instructions that unfairly shift the burden of
proof to the defendant. In that case, the defendant was charged with theft and tried before
a jury. See 639 P.2d at 208. The trial court instructed the jury that "the law presumes
that a person intends the reasonable and ordinary consequences of his own acts." Id The
Utah Supreme Court concluded this instruction violated the presumption of innocence,
reasoning:
12

The law has long recognized an inference, based on common
experience, that people generally intend the natural
consequences of their act. But common experience also
teaches that that proposition is all too often not true. People
frequently do not do what they intend and do what they do not
intend. Given the high standard of proof in a criminal case,
and the relative burdens on the prosecution and the defense,
the jury should, at most, be told that it may, on the basis of all
the evidence, including the inference that people usually
intend the natural consequences of their acts, find that the
defendant intended the natural consequences of his act. Had
that been the case, the jury would have had to consciously
make a finding as to whether the prosecution had proved the
requisite intent. But under the instructions given, that intent
was at least initially established as a matter of law, and the
burden of persuasion, in the jury's mind, may well have been
shifted to the defendant.
Id at 210. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the defendant's conviction and
remanded for a new trial.
In this case, Longoria argues
Although the language of the instruction at issue in Bales and
the language used in the instructions in this case are not
identical, the language that "under the law" and a failure to
clarify that reasons for the refusals may be consistent with
innocence have the same affect [sic] as the "implied
admission" the Utah Supreme Court found improper in Bales.
A reasonable juror could certainly interpret the language
utilized by the court to mean that if they find that the
Defendant refused to submit to field sobriety tests or refused
to submit to a chemical test, that his refusals must be
regarded as a presumption or an admission of guilt.
Brief of Appellant, p. 12.
Longoria's admission that "the language of the instruction at issue in Bales and the
language used in the instructions in this case are not identical" is an understatement. The
13

jury instructions at issue in this case bear no resemblance to those in Bales or Robichaux.
The underlying problem in both of those cases was language that mandated one inference
or another, creating either a presumption or an implied admission of guilt. The
instructions at issue here, however, do nothing more than signal to the jury that they may
consider Longoria's refusal to submit to sobriety tests. Beyond allowing the jury to
consider the evidence, the instructions explicitly state that the jury may consider the
evidence in whatever way it deems appropriate. See R. 00227, Jury Instruction 9 ("The
Defendant is not required, by law, to submit to the officer's request to perform field
sobriety tests; however, you may take notice of and give whatever weight you determine
to the fact that the defendant refused to perform any field sobriety tests."); R. 00228, Jury
Instruction 8 ("You may take notice of and give whatever weight you determine to the
Defendant's refusal to submit to the blood or breath test requested by the officer, just as
you may weigh and consider any evidence presented to you.").
Longoria appears to argue in his brief that since Utah Code section 41-6a-524
creates a presumption that an impaired driving suspect has given consent to submit to
sobriety tests, this thereby shifts the burden of proof to that suspect. Section 41-6a-524
does not, however, address the content of the evidence officers have obtained by the
suspect's submission to sobriety tests. Without addressing the content of the evidence
obtained, section 41-6a-524 does not shift the burden of proving anything to the suspect.
This section, and consequently the jury instructions the trial court issued pursuant to it,
correctly state that consent has aheady been given to sobriety tests, and that the suspect's
14

refusal to submit may or may not be relevant, depending on how the jury views the
evidence.
The express terms of these jury instructions eliminate the problems Longoria
complains of. He claims the instructions mandate a presumption of guilt where, on their
face, the instructions allow the jury to consider Longoria's refusal to test in whatever way
the jury deems appropriate. Under the express terms of the instructions, the jury could in
fact disregard Longoria's refusal to submit to tests or consider it to be evidence of
Longoria's innocence. Further, both instructions instruct the jury that Longoria is not
required to submit to the tests at all. Thus worded, the instructions are in fact more
favorable to Longoria than to the City.
Longoria's argument on this point fails to show any way in which the jury could
understand an unfair presumption of guilt from the language of the instructions. Longoria
has merely said that it is so, without any meaningful analysis to bolster the assertion. His
Robichaux argument reiterates the mistaken claim that the trial court must instruct the
jury regarding possibly innocent explanations for refusing to submit to the tests, and
concludes from the absence of such an instruction that the burden of proof has been
unfairly shifted to the defense. Longoria's argument in this regard is inadequately
briefed, see Utah R. App. P. 24, and should be disregarded by this Court. In any event, an
instruction like the one Longoria urges should not be necessary absent a contrary
instruction by the trial court that seems to alter the already existing presumption of
innocence.
15

The fact that most reasonable people would view Longoria's refusal to test as an
indication of Longoria's impairment is simply an unfortunate reality that Longoria must,
in fairness, be required to face. The alternative would be to allow a suspect to refuse to
perform sobriety tests, and then allow the suspect to disproportionately benefit from that
refusal by depriving the jury of the natural and reasonable inferences that arise out of the
refusal. In other words, the result Longoria urges on appeal would create a safe harbor
for impaired drivers, depriving the government of the most probative and direct avenues
to investigate impaired driving.

II.

HARMLESS ERROR
Even if this Court concludes the trial court was in error by not instructing the jury

as Longoria argues, the conviction should not be reversed because any error was
harmless.

A.

The instructions fairly stated the law

Utah appellate courts "will affirm when the instructions, taken as a whole, fairly
tender the case to the jury [even where] one or more of the instructions, standing alone,
are not as full or accurate as they might have been." State v. Tuckett 2000 UT App
295,^9 (quoting State v. Garrett, 849 P.2d 578, 580 (Utah Ct.App.1993)) (internal
quotations omitted) (alteration in original). Utah appellate courts "review jury
instructions in their entirety to determine whether the instructions, taken as a whole, fairly
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instruct the jury on the applicable law." Laws v. Blanding City. 893 P.2d 1083, 1084
(Utah App.), cert, denied, 910 P.2d 425 (Utah 1995). uWe reverse a trial court's decision
on the basis of an instruction improperly submitted to the jury only where the party
challenging the propriety of the instruction 'demonstrates prejudice stemming from the
instructions viewed in the aggregate.'" Ames v. Maas, 846 P.2d 468, 471 (Utah
App. 1993) (quoting State v. Haston. 811 P.2d 929, 931 (Utah App. 1991), rev'd on other
grounds. 846 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1993)).
Although a trial court is obligated "to see that the jury is presented with a party's
theory of the case," see Kilpatrick v. Wilev. 2001 UT 107,165, 37 P.3d 1130, the trial
court has broad discretion in fashioning instructions and directing the proceedings to
ensure that this obligation is met. For example, in State v. Standiford. the defendant
claimed on appeal from a conviction of murder that he was entitled to a lesser included
offense instruction regarding manslaughter. See 769 P.2d 254 (Utah 1988). The
defendant attacked "the trial court's refusal to give an instruction explaining defendant's
'theory of the case.'" Id at 266. Although the trial court refused to give an instruction
specifically tailored to the defendant's theory of the case the "court's instructions on
manslaughter, self-defense, and voluntary intoxication gave defendant the legal
framework for his theory of the case, and counsel's arguments to the jury clearly
elucidated the factual and legal issues from defendant's point of view." Id. (citing State
v. Torres. 619 P.2d 694, 695 (Utah 1980)). Ultimately, the Utah Supreme Court
concluded that, to be entitled to an instruction specifically tailored to the defendant's
17

theory of the case, the trial court must determine in its discretion that sufficient evidence
supporting that theory was presented at trial. See id.
Further, as the Utah Supreme Court stated in State v. James,
The purpose of giving instructions to the jurors is to assist
them in understanding issues which they have to decide in the
case. Included in a judge's duty to instruct the jury on the law
applicable to the case is "the right of the defendant to have his
theory of the case presented to the jury in a clear and
understandable way." However, the trial court is not required
to give any requested jury instruction if it does not comport
with the facts or does not accurately state the applicable law.
819 P.2d 781, 798-99 (Utah 1991) (internal quotations and citation omitted).
In this case, the jury was instructed that the burden of proof always rests with the
government, and that the burden is proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury was
instructed correctly regarding the elements of the crime charged, and was instructed
correctly that the jury may consider or disregard Longoria's refusal to submit to sobriety
tests. The jury was further instructed that the law does not require Longoria to submit to
those sobriety tests. These instructions "gave [Longoria] the legal framework for his
theory of the case, and counsel's arguments to the jury clearly elucidated the factual and
legal issues from defendant's point of view." Standiford. 769 P.2d at 266. Further, no
statute, rule or case law applicable in this jurisdiction mandated the instruction Longoria
sought from the trial court. The trial court was within its permitted range of discretion to
refuse the specific instruction Longoria requested, since the requested instruction did "not
comport with the facts or [did] not accurately state the applicable law." James, 819 P.2d
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at 799. Nevertheless, Longoria was free to testify regarding his motives for refusing the
tests, and counsel was free to argue to the jury a theory of innocence in refusing the tests.
Longoria's ability to testify and argue his innocence explanations for his refusal to
submit to sobriety tests highlights a major logical problem in his appellate argument.
Longoria apparently argues on appeal that a trial court's failure to instruct the jury that it
can consider a defendant's innocence explanations is the logical converse of affirmatively
instructing the jury that it cannot consider a defendant's innocence explanations. To
phrase the argument another way, failure to say X is untrue is tantamount to saying X is
true. A similarly structured argument, though silly, demonstrates the illogic of Longoria's
argument: "The trial court's refusal to instruct the jury that a witness is not a clown is the
same as the trial court instructing the jury that the witness is, indeed, a clown." Thus
reduced to its logical components, Longoria's argument makes no sense, because the trial
court's silence on the matter says nothing about whether the witness is a clown,
and the jury could not infer from the instruction that the trial court considers the witness
to be a clown.
As noted above, the jury in this case did consider Longoria's innocence
explanations in the form of testimony and argument. The trial court did nothing to deter
the jury from considering that evidence, either by express direction or by implied
disapproval of the innocent explanation evidence. Rather, the trial court remained
purposefully ambiguous regarding Longoria's refusal to test when it instructed the jury
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that it could give that refusal whatever weight it deemed appropriate. It also instructed
the jury regarding the City's burden and Longoria's presumption of innocence.

B,

Longoria has not shown prejudice

Further, assuming arguendo that the trial court committed error in its jury
instructions, such error would nevertheless be harmless. Even in Bales, after thoroughly
analyzing the flight from officers instruction and finding the instruction to have lacked
important information regarding a potentially innocent explanation for the defendant's
flight, the Utah Supreme Court nevertheless determined the omission was harmless error.
See 675 P.2d at 576. The Supreme Court reasoned that had the jury been prevented from
hearing any evidence of the defendant's flight, the evidence would nevertheless have
supported a conviction for the charge of theft.
In this case, Longoria has made no argument that, in the absence of refusal
evidence, the remaining evidence was insufficient to support a conviction. Indeed, in
context of the jury instructions that the jury could consider the evidence however it
would, in the absence of a full transcript of the trial, and without an appellate challenge to
the sufficiency of the evidence below, this Court must presume that the jury did not
believe Longoria's and counsel's innocence explanations. This Court must further
presume that the overall evidence, minus the refusal evidence, would support the jury
verdict. See Utah R. App. P. 11(e)(2) (entitled "Transcript required of all evidence
regarding challenged finding or conclusion"); State v. Nine Thousand One Hundred
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Ninety-Nine Dollars, 791 P.2d 213 (Utah App. 1990) (concluding that, because counsel
failed to provide the Court of Appeals with all relevant evidence bearing on the issues
raised on appeal, the court could only presume that the judgment was supported by
sufficient evidence); Sampson v. Richins, 770 P.2d 998 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), cert,
denied 776 P.2d 916 (Utah 1989) (stating where the record before the appellate court is
incomplete, the court is unable to review the evidence as a whole and must therefore
presume that the verdict was supported by admissible and competent evidence).
Because the evidence supported the verdict, even in the absence of the refusal
evidence, any error in the refusal instructions is harmless. This is so even under Bales,
the central case Longoria relies on for the proposition that the trial court committed error
in the first place.

CONCLUSION
Longoria has offered no applicable authority that would require reversal of the jury
verdict. The cases Longoria has cited are distinguishable and without any application to
the present case. Refusal to submit to sobriety tests bears special relevance to the
suspected crime of impaired driving, and evidence of such therefore does not require jury
instructions stating that a suspect's refusal is susceptible to an innocent explanation.
Further, the jury instructions neither expressly or impliedly shifted the burden of proof to
the defendant. Rather, the instructions provided a legal framework for defense counsel to
work out Longoria's theory of the case in argument. Finally, even if the instructions were
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erroneous, such error is harmless because sufficient evidence supported the verdict even
in the absence of the disputed evidence and instructions.
Accordingly, The City respectfully prays this Court to affirm Longoria's
convictions.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / ^ ^ a y of Oc-xo^^

, 2007.

ANDREW F. PETERSON
Orem City Prosecutor

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and correct copies of the foregoing
Appellee's Brief, postage prepaid, this fflw day of NMOOJC
following:
JASON A. SCHATZ
Attorney for Appellant
57 West 200 South #200
Salt Lake City, UT 84101

22

, 2007, to the

